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This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published 2018 in The 
Journal of Military History 
 
‘Measuring Victory: Assessing the Outcomes of 
Konfrontasi, 1963-66’ 
Dr Christopher Tuck, King’s College, London 
 
Abstract: From 1963-66 Britain and Indonesia clashed in a low-intensity conflict 
known as the Confrontation. Orthodox perspectives have coded this conflict a 
tremendous British victory. Revisionist authors have demonstrated the contingent and 
questionable nature of this conclusion.  This article re-assesses the outcomes of 
Confrontation by using an alternative methodological framework: five key themes 
drawn from the wider literature on military victory. Using such a lens supports many 
aspects of the revisionist case, but shows also that the outcomes of Confrontation are 
even more complex. Confrontation in fact provides an object lesson in the difficulties 
in assessing categorically the outcomes of war. As such, its importance to our 
understanding of the problems in defining victory in war has been greatly under-
valued. 
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This article evaluates the outcomes of the undeclared war fought between Britain 
and Indonesia from 1963-66, a conflict known as 'confrontation' (after Konfrontasi, 
the Indonesian label for it). Confrontation was for both sides a complex and difficult 
campaign. If it is less well known than the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960, it is no 
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less important. For Britain, Confrontation constituted the ‘the largest single 
operational commitment of the entire East of Suez period after 1957’1 and 'the gravest 
colonial crisis of the 1960s'.2 For Indonesia, Confrontation both reflected and 
contributed to a period of profound domestic turmoil that ended with regime change 
and a bloodletting that killed an estimated 500,000 people.  
Orthodox perspectives have seen the campaign as a triumphant British success; 
indeed an exemplary exercise in the disciplining of military means to political 
purpose. Revisionist perspectives have been much more critical, highlighting 
numerous British failures, several important Indonesian successes, and the role, 
generally, of serendipitous events in creating the illusion of British victory in what 
otherwise was a highly contingent result.  
This article re-assesses the outcomes of Confrontation by using an alternative 
methodological framework: in this case five key themes drawn from the wider 
literature on military victory.3 The concept of 'victory' is fundamental to effective 
strategy. The strategist Bernard Brodie has commented that ‘strategy is a field where 
truth is sought in pursuit of viable solutions’.4 But the viability of a given solution 
depends upon our ability to determine whether or not it works; and this in turn 
requires a determination of how we should measure success.  The enduring problems 
in doing this have particular contemporary relevance given the Western experience 
since the end of cold war: even if Western militaries seem increasingly effective on 
conventional battlefields, this does not appear to equate to a commensurate ability to 
deliver uncontested political outcomes. The literature on military victory highlights 
five particular difficulties that complicate any assessment of the success or failure of 
the use of military power: the difficulties in measuring the attainment of political 
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objectives; the problems of cost-benefit analysis; the question of whose perspective 
we privilege; the impact of perceptions; and finally the issue of time-scale. 
This article comprises of two parts. The first part analyses the orthodox and 
revisionist perspectives on the outcomes of the Confrontation campaign. The second, 
re-examines the outcomes of Confrontation according to the five core issues 
highlighted above. As this article demonstrates, using such a lens supports many 
aspects of the revisionist case, but shows also that the results of Confrontation are 
even more complex. Confrontation in fact provides an object lesson in the difficulties 
in assessing categorically the outcomes of war. As such, its importance to our 
understanding of the problems in defining victory in war has been greatly under-
valued. 
 
Konfrontasi: the case for a British success 
Orthodox perspectives on the outcomes of Confrontation dominated 
assessments of the conflict until the end of the twentieth century.5 These perspectives 
characterised Confrontation as a colossal British victory. The benchmarks used to 
reach this conclusion related to two themes: politically, Britain's attainment of its 
initial goals; and militarily, the comprehensive failure of Indonesian cross-border 
operations against Malaysia. 
Politically, Confrontation took place in a number of contexts: the Cold War, 
with the consequent concern on the part of Britain to ensure the stability of Southeast 
Asia and to prevent further inroads by Communism; of rising nationalism, with the 
consequent pressures for de-colonisation; and of the widening gap between Britain’s 
global commitments and its material resources. The proximate cause of Confrontation 
was the decision made by Britain to support the creation in 1963 of the Federation of 
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Malaysia, a new state that would combine the independent, but pro-British, state of 
Malaya with the Crown Colony of Singapore, and Britain’s colonial territories in 
Borneo comprising Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo. The British 
government painted the idea of the federation in benign tones, arguing that the 
Malaysia project was the culmination of 'the wishes of the people concerned, the 
advantages for those peoples, both internally and externally, and the advantage for 
South East Asia (and so ultimately the free world).’6 The federation was finally 
created in September 1963. In the event, Indonesia, an archipelagic state which 
included the southern portion of the island of Borneo, opposed the federation, its 
President Achmed Sukarno arguing both that the federation was designed to 
perpetuate British colonial influence in the region, and that the population of the 
territories of northern Borneo had not been consulted adequately on whether they 
were actually in favour of joining.7 
Indonesian opposition was expressed through a campaign of Konfrontasi: a 
mixture of political, economic, and military activity intended to be sufficiently robust 
to undermine the Malaysia project but also sufficiently restrained that it would not 
create the conditions for an escalation of the crisis into a major conventional war. This 
approach replicated the strategy applied successfully by Indonesia against Dutch West 
New Guinea in 1962. Militarily, the core of the Confrontation campaign comprised of 
an extended series of Indonesian cross-border raids from Kalimantan (Indonesian 
Borneo) into East Malaysia (comprising Sarawak and Sabah provinces, the latter the 
re-named colony of British North Borneo). These cross-border raids were augmented 
by subversion, terrorism, and military posturing that extended in 1964 into West 
Malaysia (Malaya and Singapore). British involvement in Confrontation in support of 
Malaysia was explained by United Kingdom policy-makers as the result of a response 
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to the request of a Commonwealth ally, under the terms of treaty obligations 
associated with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) of 1963, in the 
face of unwarranted aggression from a larger neighbour. Britain's stated objectives 
were to support Malaysia until such time as Malaysia and Indonesia could reach a 
political resolution to the conflict. In Parliament, government ministers argued that 
Britain’s primary concern was the welfare of the inhabitants of Sarawak and Sabah 
and Singapore, and to ensure that they were placed ‘in a constitutional framework 
which will give them the opportunity of the greatest measure of political stability, 
collective security and economic expansion when they become independent.’8 
The campaign was not without its difficulties. In particular, growing tensions 
between Malaya and Singapore led the latter to secede (or to be expelled, depending 
upon how one sees it) from Malaysia in August 1965. Nevertheless, the campaign 
seemed to develop in ways favourable to Britain. As the conflict became more 
protracted, President Sukarno moved further leftwards and tensions grew between the 
Indonesian army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) and the Indonesian 
Communist Party (the Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI). These tensions exploded 
into a coup attempt on the 30 September 1965; this began a process that saw the rise 
to power of a pro-Western TNI government under General Suharto. 
 Confrontation came to an end through the ratification on 11 August 1966 of a 
peace settlement between Indonesia and Malaysia. In relation to the United 
Kingdom’s overarching goals, this peace treaty was an apparent triumph: Indonesia 
recognised Malaysia, ceased its campaign of Konfrontasi, and agreed to accept the 
outcome of scheduled elections in East Malaysia in 1967 as a sufficient test on the 
part of the people of Borneo of their desire to be part of Malaysia. For Britain, the 
campaign was ‘a victory, a compensation for the humiliation of Aden, which was 
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being played out as ‘Confrontation’ ended and still had a year to go.’9 Traditional 
interpretations have therefore viewed the British performance as exemplary. 
Militarily, the outcomes were heavily in Britain’s favour despite British and 
Commonwealth troops being outnumbered significantly on the ground. At 
Confrontation’s conclusion, 1600 Indonesian troops had been killed, wounded or 
captured, as against only 300 Commonwealth casualties.10 Politically, Britain 
appeared to obtain all that it wanted. Indonesia established normal relations with 
Malaysia, accepting it as an independent state. A process of regime change within 
Indonesia resulted in the effective removal of the virulently anti-Western Sukarno and 
his replacement with a government under General Suharto. This new regime pursued 
a pro-West policy and set about destroying the Indonesian communist party. 
Assessing the results, Sir Denis Healey, the British Minister of Defence from 
October 1964, labelled the Confrontation campaign as ‘one of the most efficient uses 
of military force in the history of the world.11 General Sir Walter Walker, Director of 
Borneo Operations (in effect, the joint military commander) until March 1965, 
characterised Confrontation as a ‘decisive victory’.12  Politically, ending 
Confrontation reflected, in the words of one British official at the time ‘The greatest 
success of British diplomacy in East Asia in recent years.’13 This view remained 
afterwards firmly entrenched in the limited literature on Confrontation, with 
commentators characterising the British performance in Confrontation as a total 
victory14 and the best-conducted British campaign since the end of the Second World 
War.15 The British performance was assessed as having been ‘one of the most 
efficient ever conducted in a jungle environment’.16  
 From the late 1990s onwards, the release of official documents on the conflict 
led to the emergence of a revisionist perspectives. Important works by Matthew Jones, 
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John Subritzky, and David Easter highlighted Britain's mounting difficulties during 
the conflict and the invalidation of many of its initial goals and assumptions.17 These 
works added new dimensions to the analysis of the outcomes of Confrontation. It was 
evident, for example, that Britain did not achieve all of its objectives. Malaysia was 
supposed to reduce the costs of the Singapore base and allow Britain to continue its 
regional presence. Confrontation, however, ensured that: 'The asking price to be paid 
for remaining a Far Eastern power proved too high.'18 Moreover, British objectives 
changed during Confrontation. After the 30 September coup, with Britain still initially 
believing that any new Indonesian regime would remain wedded to Confrontation, 
British aims focused instead on the need 'to control the terms and conditions of a 
British withdrawal and avoid being shamefully bundled out.'19 Indeed, this point could 
be taken as indicative of Confrontation's contingent outcome. Britain actually 
believed that it was losing Confrontation and the coup, therefore, was seen as an 
opportunity to negotiate a settlement, perhaps sparing the UK from a humiliating 
outcome.20 The revisionist perspective also touches upon Indonesian perspectives on 
the outcomes of the conflict. For Subritzky, for example, victory for Britain was 
pyrrhic and 'Insofar as British withdrawal and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 
not the destruction of Malaysia per se, was his ultimate objective, the Indonesian 
president, Sukarno, had succeeded beyond expectation'.21  
Based as they are on primary sources, the revisionist perspectives provide a 
compelling insight into the limitations of the orthodox literature in assessing the 
outcomes of Confrontation. But these excellent revisionist works were not intended to 
provide a systematic analysis of the quality of outcomes for Britain and Indonesia. 
Moreover, several more recent interpretations have continued to portray 
Confrontation as an exemplary British success.22 
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By applying more systematically themes derived from the literature on victory, we 
can gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of the issue of success and failure 
in Confrontation. Further, this complexity in itself can tell us a great deal about the 
concept of victory in war. Examining the literature on victory in war, five themes are 
prominent in explaining why success is war is difficult to measure: problems in 
assessing the attainment of political objectives; difficulties in cost-benefit analysis; 
the question of whose perspective we privilege; the impact of perceptions; and, 
finally, the issue of time-scale. 
 
Attaining Political Objectives 
 
One obvious criterion for assessing the outcomes of Confrontation would 
seem to be the political goals of its chief protagonists. After all, war is instrumental: it 
is designed to achieve a purpose, so these purposes rationally would seem to be 
appropriate metrics against which to judge success or failure. This approach, of 
course, is central to orthodox perspectives on British success. 
However, it is clear that declared political objectives can be a problematic 
benchmark against which to judge eventual outcomes. One difficulty is that political 
objectives often are not stated with clarity at the outset of war.23 It can often also be 
that the stated goals have a transcendental quality to them - ‘heroic self-defence,’ for 
example – making it difficult to gauge realistically if they have actually been 
attained.24 Alternatively, the need to sustain domestic or international support may 
actually require goals that are an ambiguous compromise. 25 Indeed, ambiguous goals 
may have utility for a state in terms of maintaining flexibility and in avoiding clear 
criteria by which failure might later be judged.26  Nor, crucially, can we assume that 
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political goals remain constant during war.27 Changing circumstances caused by such 
factors as battlefield outcomes, domestic political changes, or international politics 
will often lead belligerents to alter their objectives.28  
Confrontation embodies several of these crucial difficulties. When we take a 
closer look at Britain’s political objectives, it becomes clear that the declared 
intentions of the British government did not reflect many of the actual goals sought by 
British policy-makers. In private, the British objective at the outset of Confrontation 
was directed towards trying to sustain Malaysia because it would allow Britain to 
extend its stay in its bases at Singapore by reducing the political and financial 
burden.29 Sustaining a British presence in Southeast Asia, but at a reduced cost and 
with increased legitimacy, was thus the central British goal. 
Judged in relation to this undeclared objective, Confrontation produced poor 
results. Fighting Indonesia raised, rather than lowered, the costs of sustaining a British 
presence in Southeast Asia. Moreover, by 1965 serious questions were being asked in 
Whitehall about the viability in the long term of the Singapore bases, doubts that were 
reinforced when Singapore itself left the federation, unravelling much of the raison 
d'etre for the Malaysia project in the first place. By 1967, the Wilson government had 
announced its intention to withdraw from Singapore and downgrade Britain’s 
presence East of Suez.  
 However, using as a benchmark Britain's initial undeclared goal is itself 
problematic because British objectives changed over time. For example, by mid-1964, 
Britain’s growing economic problems and the need to rationalise and prioritise British 
defence meant that it was recognised increasingly that Singapore was not a viable 
base even in the medium term.30 At this time, however, there seemed to be two 
compelling objectives that were still served by Confrontation. One was to maintain 
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the Singapore base for as long as possible in order to maximise British influence with 
its key ally, the US.31  The second was defeat avoidance. A political compromise with 
Indonesia would look internationally like a set-back for Britain – it would strengthen 
anti-Westernism, encourage Communism, and create the perception that Britain had 
reneged on its defence commitment to Malaysia, undermining Britain’s relationships 
elsewhere with its allies.32 By mid-1965 the costs of Confrontation meant that Britain 
had come to seek any outcome that would relieve Britain of the burden of 
Confrontation as long as that settlement was acceptable to Malaysia.33 But in the 
context of the war in Vietnam and the broader struggle against Communism in 
Southeast Asia such an outcome was anathema to the US. 34 It was made clear to 
Britain that American economic and military help elsewhere, including financial 
support for Sterling, was contingent on supporting US interests in the Far East.35 By 
December 1965, then, Britain persevered with Confrontation primarily to sustain its 
relationship with its allies, especially the United States. 
But which of these objectives should be prioritised in assessing outcomes? 
Earlier objectives cannot necessarily be weighted more heavily, since there may be 
good reasons why they are modified or discarded. Britain was unsuccessful in 
achieving many of its original goals, but it did succeed in avoiding the appearance of 
defeat, and the consequent damage to its credibility. Moreover, persevering with 
Confrontation, did, in the end, service important alliance relationships as well as 
delivering a regional ally in the form of the pro-Western, virulently anti-Communist 
Indonesian regime of President Suharto. 
 
Relative Costs and Gains 
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A second issue raised by the literature on victory is that success or failure in 
war rarely is a binary outcome (i.e. where one side wins absolutely and therefore the 
other side loses absolutely): outcomes instead are usually relative in nature.36 Success 
in a war therefore could instead be judged relative to the costs and benefits of fighting 
it; positive outcomes, for example, may be outweighed if the costs of the war are 
immense. But outcomes can also be considered relative to the opponent – even if a 
state achieves only a few of its objectives, if this is more than the other side then a 
conflict might still be construed as a success. It is also entirely possible, therefore, that 
neither side wins outright.37 Thus, even if the political outcomes of Confrontation 
were complex, we might still judge the outcomes for Britain very favourably if they 
were achieved at little relative cost. Or, for example, if Britain failed to achieve most 
of its objectives, Confrontation might still be regarded as a success if Indonesia 
achieved even fewer.  
In practice, however, this vital relative assessment compounds earlier 
analytical problems because it compares one uncertain set of benchmarks against 
another. How, for example, do we weigh the costs and benefits of armed conflicts 
especially in complex unconventional fighting in which relative casualty rates or the 
movements of front lines fail to give an accurate approximation of progress.38 Should 
we weigh tangible costs and benefits (casualties, resources) against the intangible 
(honour, prestige, credibility, legitimacy)?39 Moreover, if we assess victory in relation 
to the enemy, can we assume that both sides assess costs and benefits in the same 
way?40 And are there other comparators that we should use in this cost-benefit 
assessment: should we measure whether a state better is better off after a war than 
before it; or whether the results of the war were better or worse than alternative 
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courses of action; or whether a state performed better than other states in similar 
circumstances?41 
 On this basis, there are to begin with historiographical difficulties in 
determining what Indonesia wanted from Konfrontasi, making relative assessment 
with Britain difficult. Indonesian foreign policy was dominated by a single individual 
- the mercurial, impulsive President Sukarno. Indonesian foreign policy objectives 
therefore are not easy to fathom, making comparative attainment difficult to calculate. 
As Rex Mortimer has argued: 'Sukarno's ultimate objectives in the confrontation of 
Malaysia were never clearly defined and have been the subject of controversy'.42 
Indonesia’s key declared objective in the early stages of Confrontation was laid out at 
meetings in Manila in June and July 1963. Indonesia would accept Malaysia if an 
impartial and independent ascertainment process took place to determine whether the 
peoples of Sarawak and Sabah wished to be part of the federation.43 But other 
pronouncements also implied a range of other goals in pursuing Confrontation. One 
goal seems to have been to thwart perceived threats. These included the threat posed 
by Malaysia as a neo-colonial construct which might perpetuate colonial influence on 
Indonesia’s borders, as well as suspicion of the intentions of Malaysia’s large Chinese 
minority.44 Associated with this goal were the removal of UK bases and the creation 
of some kind of regional grouping that would be responsible for peace and security. It 
is also clear that Indonesia had a wide range of undeclared objectives. These 
objectives included eliciting greater prestige and respect for Indonesia and reinforcing 
the argument that it deserved to be consulted over significant regional political 
change.45 Nation-building seems to have been another goal, with Confrontation 
reinforcing historical narratives of struggles for independence against oppressive 
external powers.46 
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 But perhaps the key unarticulated objective of Confrontation was domestic 
power balancing. The struggle against Malaysia and its allies perpetuated a febrile 
atmosphere of revolutionary struggle. This external struggle focused Indonesians 
away from the country’s domestic problems and thus put off the need to engage in 
economic reforms that would have hit many Indonesians hard and been politically 
divisive.47 Crucially, it reinforced in addition Sukarno's role as 'national shadow 
puppet-master' in managing the antagonistic relationship between the two key 
domestic forces: the army and the communist party.48 In many respects, Confrontation 
was 'the external expression of the very nature of Guided Democracy serving as a 
common denominator for political elements joined in adverse partnership'.49 
 Complicating matters further are the changes that appeared to take place in 
Indonesian objectives. Sukarno's evident frustration at Indonesia's failure to obtain 
early political concessions led him to escalate his rhetoric. In 1963, he asserted 
publicly his determination to ganjang Malaysia (to 'mouth' it or 'eat it up'); and in 
1964 he announced that Malaysia would be destroyed 'by the time the cock crows on 
January 1, 1965'.50 But did this reflect a substantive change in Indonesian objectives, 
or was this merely an escalation in Indonesian attempts at coercion? In March and 
May 1965 Sukarno made tentative political overtures to Malaysia.51 This might have 
been, as Britain believed, simply an Indonesian ploy: but it might indicate by this 
stage that Indonesia desired a compromise. After the coup of 30 September, General 
Suharto's regime maintained a declaratory commitment to Confrontation. But it was 
evident through their efforts at a negotiated settlement that Indonesia's objectives had 
changed to obtaining a political agreement with Malaysia so that the government 
could focus its efforts on resolving Indonesias's crippling economic crisis.52 
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 The relative attainment of objectives in Confrontation therefore is problematic 
to judge because it isn't wholly clear what goals Indonesia pursued nor their relative 
importance. Indonesia certainly seems to have achieved some goals. The costs of 
Confrontation almost certainly expedited Britain's decision to terminate its presence 
in Singapore. The conflict also seemed to strengthen the power of regionalism, and 
Indonesia's place within it. The Indonesian Foreign Minister argued in 1966 in 
relation to Confrontation that: 'No one has won or lost. Victory goes to the Malayan 
people, the great race in Southeast Asia, to which both Indonesia and Malaysia 
belong'.53 In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came into 
being, with Indonesia as a key power.54 On the other hand, Malaysia was not 'eaten 
up'. The political settlement that was agreed 'made only symbolic concessions', in 
which the wishes of the population of East Malaysia would be ascertained through 
elections that were due anyway in 1967, and in which none of the candidates stood on 
a platform of withdrawal from the federation.55 Franklin B. Weinstein argues that: 
'From the standpoint of the issues ostensibly involved in the Malaysia dispute, the 
final settlement was in fact a rather complete capitulation on Indonesia's part'.56 
Certainly, some in the Indonesian elite took this view, the then ambassador to 
Washington opining that: 'It has become quite clear that for all our claims to 
international leadership we ended up with an even greater dependency on foreign 
credits and with our freedom of action seriously compromised.'57 Furthermore, if 
Confrontation was motivated primarily by domestic objectives aimed towards 
cementing Sukarno's rule as interlocutor between other antagonistic political actors, 
then it must certainly be classed a colossal failure.  
 An alternative would be to weight the outcomes according to relative costs. 
This idea features heavily in orthodox assessments: Confrontation is deemed a British 
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success because Britain achieved so much with so little relative to the enemy. For 
example, General Walker noted, from a military perspective, the ‘pathetically small’ 
forces that he had available to counter an enemy that he argued was as strong as the 
Vietcong and North Vietnam.58 Economically, Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister, in 1966 justified to the Indonesian people the ending of Confrontation 
because it was consuming some 70% of the government budget.59  
 But elements of this argument are contestable. The notion that Confrontation 
was a low-cost conflict for Britain is a myth.60 Whilst the forces deployed in Borneo 
appeared relatively small, and casualties very limited, Confrontation required the 
maintenance in Southeast Asia of forces not just to defend East Malaysia, but to help 
defend West Malaysia, to deter Indonesia from escalation, and to service a variety of 
contingency plans covering options up to, and including, conventional war. As Healey 
noted in 1965: ‘confrontation with Indonesia might escalate at any time to a level 
which would immediately require some 50 percent of our land forces, 75 percent of 
our air strike capability and 90 percent of our escort fleet. If such an escalation were 
to last for more than a few months, confrontation alone would involve virtually the 
whole of our existing Service man-power.’61 At the same time, the actual number of 
Indonesian forces committed to Confrontation was quite small. In the first quarter of 
1965, for example, total Indonesian forces committed in Borneo amounted to some 
22,000 men.62 Economically, British officials assumed that Indonesia was suffering 
less than Britain. The British ambassador to Indonesia, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, 
commented in August 1965 that, for the Indonesians ‘Confrontation has been too 
successful and painless.’63 In fact, economic conditions in Indonesia were certainly 
dire by 1966 and far worse than those that existed in Britain. In 1965, for example, 
inflation in the price of rice had reached 900 percent a year.64 Whether Confrontation 
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was using 70% of the Indonesian budget, however, is arguable, since Malik, of 
course, had good reasons to inflate the costs in order to justify the benefits to the 
Indonesian people of the August 1966 political settlement. 
 Cost benefit analyses relative to other conflicts are also cited by some as 
indicators of British success; but, in reality, they are equally contentious. One British 
officer commented that ‘Borneo could so easily have become another Vietnam… it is 
against this background that its success must be measured’.65 But comparing 
Confrontation with Vietnam is problematic: no two wars are ever exactly the same, 
and context is crucial.66 The US’ struggle against North Vietnam was an order of 
magnitude more challenging than Confrontation, comprising of an enemy strategy 
that combined a systematic internal insurgency closely linked to an active, large-scale 
conventional military campaign.67 Moreover, comparing the outcomes for Britain or 
Indonesia of fighting Confrontation against the costs of not doing is highly 
problematic. United Kingdom policy-makers after the conflict argued for the dire 
consequences of failing to confront Indonesia, including the emergence of a 'Djakarta-
Peking axis'.68 Such arguments were, in retrospect, exaggerated; and also counter-
factual and thus improvable. 
 Two further points complicate calculations. First, costs and benefits in 
Confrontation were revalued over time as objectives changed. Britain wanted the 
August 1966 peace settlement between Malaysia and Indonesia. But, in private, 
British policy-makers believed that Indonesia would continue Confrontation and that 
Malaysia was likely to enter the former's sphere of influence. These costs were now 
deemed entirely acceptable because Britain's priorities by this stage were to end the 
conflict and to establish friendly relations with Indonesia.69 Nor is it absolutely certain 
that a direct relationship can be established between Confrontation and regime change 
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in Indonesia, as Indonesia had been politically unstable since its creation.70 Sukarno’s 
domestic policy, like his foreign policy, was built around creating and then 
manipulating crises. Confrontation might have accelerated the clash between the army 
and the communists; but it did not create it, and tensions were already growing severe 
even before Confrontation erupted.71 
Finally, there are debates to be had about what should be considered a cost and 
how intangibles should be measured. For some Indonesians, the price of 
Confrontation, especially the events that followed the 30 September coup, constituted 
deep-seated metaphysical damage. These costs include profound social wounds 
caused by the way in which the new regime made wider Indonesian society complicit 
in the violent destruction of actual and suspected communists. In Christian areas, for 
example, the Church made victims of the anti-communist purge confess their sins in 
public.72 The metaphysical damage also included such things as the 'othering' by the 
new military regime of many elements of Indonesian society, including not just 
communists but also socialists, some religious communities, and atheists.73 These 
costs also extended to Indonesians' ownership of their own past. The new regime 
created and defended myths necessary to justify the coup and what came after, and to 
legitimise the New Order government.74 In other words, the issues of costs and 
benefits in relation to Confrontation can be extended much further than the narrow 
political and economic interests of the state. 
 
From Whose Perspective? 
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To complicate matters even further, the literature on victory highlights the 
importance in judgements on success in war of the question of whose perspective we 
should be taking when we assess the success or failure of an armed conflict.  
Different political actors can, depending on their perspective, reach different, 
though perhaps equally legitimate, conclusions regarding who has won or lost, 
because different actors may have different interests and biases and may weigh costs 
and benefits differently.75 Even within a belligerent, judgements over the success or 
failure of military action may vary across a range of interested actors including 
political elites, the government, the public, the media, and the armed forces. Indeed, 
winning a war militarily may not be the only, or event the most important, interest 
that a political actor might have.76 So whose view really matters: political leaders; the 
domestic population; the international community? 
The complexities arising from different answers to this question become 
quickly evident when one looks at the outcomes of Confrontation for actors within 
Indonesia. As revisionist perspectives demonstrate, Indonesia achieved some of its 
key objectives during Confrontation. But states are not, in practice, unitary actors. 
Successes and failures for the abstraction that is a state may seem very different for 
key actors and constituencies within it, since their own objectives often are not the 
same as those of the state of which they are a part.  
 Thus, Indonesia might well be able to claim several successes during 
Confrontation, but this was of little solace to Sukarno, the primary architect of 
Konfrontasi. The Indonesian President was a clear loser. Whatever objectives he 
identified for Indonesia in pursuing Confrontation, it was designed to strengthen his 
position and certainly not to weaken it. However, Confrontation exacerbated the 
domestic contradictions within Indonesia, making it impossible, finally, for Sukarno 
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to continue his balancing act between the Indonesian army and the communist party.77 
The 30 September coup began a process that broke Sukarno's power. Although he was 
not officially deposed as President, in retrospect the army effectively sidelined 
Sukarno from March 1966.78 
 For both the Indonesian communist party (the PKI) and the Indonesian army 
(the TNI), Confrontation during its prosecution for several years delivered positive 
outcomes. Though the PKI's declaratory goal in Confrontation was the destruction of 
Malaysia, its actual objective was to use the conflict to assist its rise to power in 
Indonesia.79 Until the 30 September coup, Confrontation performed this function 
successfully, the PKI extending its political and economic influence, marginalising 
many rivals, and encouraging Sukarno's radical shift leftwards.80 For the TNI, 
Confrontation staved off moves to undermine the army's economic position. It 
provided a possible opportunity to re-introduce martial law and to establish a 
nationalist rhetoric that helped to undercut the appeal of the PKI and improve the 
army's reputation with the wider population.81  
 However, since the PKI and TNI were mutually antagonistic, the two became 
locked into a zero-sum game. Over time, it became clear that the main beneficiary of 
Confrontation was the PKI, which was attempting even to infiltrate the TNI and to 
establish a worker's militia as a rival military force.82 The army also worried that 
Confrontation was escalating to the point at which it might become a conventional 
war, an eventuality which might in turn have profoundly negative consequences for 
the TNI.83  The resolution of this internal struggle through the events that followed the 
30 September coup reversed decisively these positions. It became evident that, shorn 
of Sukarno's protection, the PKI's organisation and resources were simply inadequate 
in the face of those possessed by the army. The Communists were portrayed in 
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General Suharto's counter-coup as illegitimate, unpatriotic agents of China. The PKI 
was destroyed, the organisation being banned and its membership either killed or 
imprisoned in a systematic campaign initiated and conducted by the army, alongside 
other sympathetic actors.84 There is still some dispute over the numbers of those that 
lost their lives: at the time, the official tally was under 90,000; this is certainly a 
grotesque under-statement; half a million is a recurrent figure in the literature, though 
some have argued that the figure was up to a million.85 General Suharto specifically, 
and the army generally, were huge beneficiaries of the process by which 
Confrontation ended dominating unchallenged the Indonesian political system until 
the 1990s. 
 But Confrontation illustrates other layers of complexity. Even using such 
labels as 'the army' or 'the PKI' imposes a level of coherence in objectives that was not 
necessarily present. For example, in the army, there were many officers who 
genuinely did sympathise with Indonesia's declared objectives, believing that 
Malaysia was a real threat and an affront to Indonesia's status as a regional power. 
Indeed, the 30 September coup itself was launched by a core of army units. Moreover, 
even the majority anti-PKI element in the army consisted of several factions. The 
faction surrounding General Yani was more supportive of Sukarno, believing that his 
support for the Communists was a short term tactical move, whereas those behind 
General Nasution believed that the PKI had successfully subverted Sukarno.86 Even 
for the army, therefore, the outcomes of Confrontation were not uniform. For these 
TNI factions, the demise of Sukarno represented different qualities of outcome. 
Indeed, Yani was killed in the coup and Nasution himself was marginalised by 
Indonesia's new leader General Suharto.  
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 Similarly, assessing the implications for the 'PKI' can be misleading. Many of 
those that suffered during the campaign to crush the communists were only tenuously 
linked to the organisation. The Suharto regime's definition of what constituted a 
communist included groups sometimes with only the loosest affiliation to the PKI. 
For example, to be a 'communist' in 1966 in Indonesia might involve simply being on 
the list of those that benefited from the Agrarian Land Reform Law. This programme, 
intended to distribute land to those without it, was implemented with the help of the 
PKI but it was a Sukarno government programme.87 Beyond those executed, some 
one and half a million Indonesians also were arrested and imprisoned. Many of these 
were subjected to torture and served prison terms of ten to fourteen years. Further, the 
new regime's propaganda vilifying the PKI created widespread fear about associating 
with ex-political prisoners. Those arrested, even if subsequently released because of 
lack of evidence, acquired pariah status. With ‘E/T’ or ‘ex-tapol’ ('tapol' being the 
abbreviation for Tahanan Politik or political prisoner) stamped on their identity cards, 
individuals and their families became effectively persona non grata in Indonesian 
society, excluded by their communities and by the state. 88 
 These points reinforce the potentially very wide list of groups for whom 
conflict can deliver markedly different outcomes. M. C. Rickleffs, notes, for example, 
that whatever the outcomes of Confrontation 'a greater tragedy lay in the suffering of 
the Indonesian people'.89 Those that 'lost' included, for example, those loyal to 
Sukarno; and also socialists; atheists (who were labelled Communists by many 
religious groups); and traditional religions (who similarly were seen as atheists by the 
officially sanctioned religious establishment).90 The ethnic Chinese minority in 
Indonesia was also associated with the Communist cause.91 As Adrian Vickers 
asserts, 'Much of a generation of the country's brightest minds, teachers, artists, 
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journalists and natural leaders, was killed or treated like pariahs'.92 Gender-based 
perspectives on the outcomes of the 1965 coup expose the sufferings imposed on 
women; suffering which has often been ignored because of inherent gender biases in 
assessing the costs of war.93 Many of those involved in Gerwani, the PKI's women's 
movement, were attracted not so much by Communist ideology but simply by the 
organisation’s progressive attitude towards improving women's lives.94 Others were 
accused of being in Gerwani simply because their socially forward-looking views 
marked them out as trouble-makers.95 Military propaganda portrayed Gerwani as a 
brutal and sexualised organisation.96 Partly in consequence, those women and girls 
arrested, or those that were relatives of those arrested, often experienced profound 
trauma. Sexual violence, including rape, sexualised mutilation and torture, sexual 
humiliation, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery and enforced abortion were 
'pervasive' during the period.97 Women's guilt often was by association. Those whose 
husbands were arrested or killed might find themselves diambil ('taken') as a forced 
wife, or as an unofficial wife, or compelled into prostitution.98 More widely, the 
Suharto regime's focus on the immorality of the PKI generally, and Gerwani 
specifically, helped to undermine the legitimacy of all forms of progressive women's 
activism. Part of the stability promised by the New Order rested upon the conception 
that women should play their 'proper role' in society, a role defined in traditional 
terms.99 Thus, even if 'Indonesia' gained many of its objectives during Confrontation, 
many Indonesians lost profoundly. The consequences of the 30 September coup 
extended much more widely than the PKI, and much more widely than the two 
million Indonesians that were killed or detained. 
Even in Britain, the outcomes varied depending upon one's choice of actor. 
After the conflict, the British military defined Confrontation as a significant success. 
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Perhaps the key exponent of this view was General Walker. For Walker, 
Confrontation was ‘a complete success’.100 In particular, Walker drew attention to the 
direct link between British and Commonwealth military tactical success and the 
positive strategic political outcome for Britain. Walker saw as one of the key 
facilitators of this relationship Operation Claret: a campaign of secret cross-border 
military operations into Indonesian Borneo that deprived the TNI of the initiative and 
convinced Britain’s adversary that it could not win. Walker’s view was that Claret 
'brought the Indonesians to the conference table in 1966.'101 Certainly, at the tactical 
military level the campaign seemed for the British and Commonwealth soldiers 
involved a hard-fought but successful campaign.102 
However, during Confrontation, British military operational level perspectives 
(including those of Walker himself) were much more pessimistic. The problem 
seemed to be that British operations were so constrained that Indonesian leaders were 
simply not aware of Indonesian military failures because Indonesian military 
subordinates 'who conceal or distort the true situation have probably convinced 
Sukarno himself that the military activities have had some success.'103 In the latter 
part of 1965, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Air Marshal Sir John Grandy argued 
that Britain had had ‘some tactical success’ against Indonesia but that British 
activities had ‘had no strategic effect in that they have not changed Indonesia’s aims, 
nor have they affected her capability to sustain or, even to increase the present level of 
confrontation.’104 Additional evidence, drawn from documents and interrogations 
obtained from captured Indonesian cross-border raiders, seemed to reinforce the 
British military’s perception that the peace deal of August 1966 was not a victory at 
all: it was a sell-out that guaranteed success for the Indonesians. Reflecting the more 
general private British view that Confrontation was going well for the Indonesians, 
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and that the latter’s antipathy towards Malaysia was implacable, the military view was 
that the August 1966 peace settlement was simply a ruse: a mechanism by which 
Indonesia could de-couple Britain from the conflict. Borneo Headquarters, for 
example, took the view that the Indonesians were ‘using the end of confrontation as a 
cover to obtain by other means what they had failed to achieve by overt hostilities.'105 
Borneo headquarters was firmly of the opinion, even in September 1966, that 
Indonesia’s ‘friendly overtures … are only a cloak to cover Indonesia’s real intent and 
determination to destroy Malaysia’.106 
This view extended even to some of the key political decision-makers. For 
example, one concern of Denis Healey was to ensure that after a political settlement 
had been reached to end Confrontation, British forces were removed from Borneo as 
quickly as possible. Indeed, the draw-down of forces began the day after the 
settlement was signed. Part of the reason for this was Healey’s belief that Indonesia 
might well re-commence Confrontation, a situation that might drag Britain back into 
the fray. It was crucial, therefore, that British forces were exited as quickly as possible 
so that if Confrontation began again, the UK could argue that it was no longer a 
British responsibility to protect Malaysia.107 
For some Indonesian actors, then, Confrontation did indeed represent a 
colossal political defeat. Moreover, the list of those who suffered potentially is very 
wide. But for others, General Suharto and the TNI especially, the outcomes were 
hugely favourable. Equally, for some British actors, the peace settlement of 1966 was 
a qualified result that represented not a decisive victory but only a pause in Indonesian 
aggression.  
 
Perception 
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Perhaps more than anything, this analysis of the complexities of judging 
success and failure in Confrontation illustrates the importance of perception (and the 
shaping of perception). As the literature on victory identifies, calculations regarding 
success or failure in war often are a matter of perceived outcomes. In other words, 
rather than ‘score keeping’ an armed conflict, attempting to weigh objectively the 
costs and benefits of war or the attainment of political objectives, audiences instead 
‘match-fix’: observers form a general opinion of whether a war has been won or lost 
and interpret the metrics to fit this.108 Victory and defeat, in other words, are often 
‘imagined’ conditions.109 Formal peace settlements, acknowledged publicly by both 
sides, might in theory be expected to define a common narrative on a war’s 
outcome.110 But actually, perceptions on the outcome of a war are shaped by many 
things: the media; pre-existing mind sets; psychological biases; and/or salient 
events.111 
For example, if the reality was that Indonesian military operations were 
unsuccessful tactically, this was not necessarily always the perception from an 
Indonesian military point of view. As one British participant noted in a conversation 
after the war with an Indonesian officer: ‘To him the issue was quite clear: we had 
raided into Indonesia regularly and just as regularly had been driven off so they had 
won.’112  
But what matters in particular are the perceptions of key constituencies. For 
the British government, the key constituency was domestic opinion. British public 
opinion on the outcome of the campaign was shaped by issues regarding access to 
information (or the lack thereof). One factor was that the British government did not 
openly announce the changes over time to its objectives. Thus, the public was simply 
 26 
unaware of the relevant objectives, costs and benefits against which Confrontation 
might be judged. In this context, the growing cost of the war, its longevity, and the 
changing objectives, were either hidden from view or portrayed as the inescapable 
costs of Britain honourably standing by its Malaysian ally. In that sense, the most 
obvious costs to the UK were the physical and financial ones, but these were not 
excessive: 64 killed and 89 wounded, and five million sterling per year.113 These were 
set against the Government’s public articulation of the costs of failing against 
Indonesia, ‘the tragedy that could have fallen on a whole corner of a continent if we had 
not been able to hold the situation and bring it to a successful termination’.114  
 A second factor was that the nature of the final settlement: in particular, that 
this was a formal settlement process marked by a peace agreement. This peace 
agreement provided open and unequivocal symbolic acknowledgement of the 
attainment of the original goals that the government had announced openly: there 
appeared to be no room for debate, therefore, about the outcome. Third, there had 
been little open scrutiny of the conduct of Confrontation that would have allowed a 
more informed debate on its success or failure. Geography helped: in Borneo, for 
example, the poor infrastructure and dense jungle meant that journalists were wholly 
reliant on the Ministry of Defence for access to combat areas. Moreover, certainly by 
1966, the Foreign Office was running an effective information and propaganda 
campaign, helping to shape the strategic narrative on the campaign. Indeed, because 
the Indonesian government had banned foreign journalists, British government 
sources were often the only source of credible information of what was going on in 
Indonesia.115 For these reasons, the British public perceived Confrontation as an 
unequivocal success.  
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The issues of access to information, lack of critical scrutiny, and important 
symbolic events are relevant also in Indonesian public discourse. In the Indonesian 
case, the information issue was manifest not just in the withholding of evidence, but 
of the deliberate and systematic manufacture of evidence on the nature, costs and 
benefits of Confrontation. An Indonesian historian noted in 1965 that 'history 
instruction is an important means of training good citizens and of developing love and 
loyalty for one's country; it is essential to a young country like Indonesia for the 
"nation building" in which its people are all engaged'.116 This instrumental view of the 
function of history was embraced by Suharto's regime in its efforts to shape popular 
Indonesian perceptions of the events surrounding Confrontation in order to enhance 
the legitimacy of the new regime. Under Sukarno, anti-imperialism was the key 
legitimating theme, focusing therefore on the 'enemy without'. Under Suharto, 
however, the narrative changed to anti-communism and the army's role in protecting 
Indonesia from the 'enemy within'.117 The Suharto regime set about creating a new 
history of the Sukarno period through such means as standardised official school and 
university textbooks; the banning of contradictory literature; and a programme of 
army propaganda conducted through films, books, memorials and museums, and 
choreographed acts of commemoration.118 These measures included, for example, the 
creation of the Museum of Communist Treachery, which laid out a narrative of an 
insidious communist canker eating away at Indonesia for the twenty years since its 
independence and which school children were compulsorily required to visit.119 
 In this narrative, Sukarno and the communists were the villains, not the 
Malaysians or the British. Confrontation itself was marginalised, becoming one 
discrete element in the folly of Sukarno and the treachery of the PKI. In the army 
narrative, Confrontation was 'launched by the Communists through the former regime 
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of Indonesia'.120 Confrontation, then, was not a defeat for Indonesia or its military but 
for Sukarno and the PKI. In this crisis only the military and its successful deterrence 
of external threats prevented Indonesia from being destroyed. 121 The final peace 
settlement was mobilised to help reinforce this narrative. Suharto declared that 'Peace 
with Malaysia is not capitulation but a compromise in the interests of both parties and 
peace in South-East Asia'.122 In making this credible, he was aided by Malaysia, 
which wished to restore cordial relations as quickly as possible. Thus Malaysia's 
premier avoided any triumphalism in the signing of the August 1966 peace 
agreement, instead portraying the end of Confrontation as 'good for all'.123 Both the 
Indonesian and British publics therefore could believe that they had achieved success. 
Given the importance of these constituencies to their respective governments, did it 
really matter if the perceptions of success did not accord with many aspects of the 
reality? 
 
Over what time period?  
 
A final issue that complicates judgements regarding success and failure in war 
is that of the point in time at which this judgement is drawn. The difficulty here is that 
taking a shorter or a longer time-frame can change radically one’s assessment of the 
outcome of a war. In 1918, for example, the First World War was perceived from a 
British perspective as a costly but decisive success; but viewed from the perspective 
of 1939, the outcome would seem much more ambivalent. For many, taking an 
extended temporal view on the issue is vital: real successes in war are long-lasting; 
they resolve deep-seated political issues.124  
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On this basis, for example, it might be possible to argue that long-term 
developments vindicated for Britain positive assessments of the outcomes of 
Confrontation. The war provided a necessary corrective to the mistaken defence and 
foreign policy assumptions made by British policy-makers in 1963. Even if 
Confrontation itself were not a success judged in 1966, in the long-term its outcomes 
could be construed as positive. Certainly, the negative developments expected by 
British policy-makers in August 1966 did not emerge. Suharto’s regime proved more 
amenable to Western interests than was predicted. The August 1966 settlement did 
establish a functioning status quo between Malaysia and Indonesia: if relations 
between them were not always cordial, they worked well enough for British interests. 
Confrontation demonstrated early on that the British calculation that it could remain 
in Singapore for the medium term was largely beyond its financial and political 
strength. It also demonstrated that key defence policy assumptions, for example that 
Britain’s military requirements in Southeast Asia could be met with limited 
intervention forces, were also mistaken. If we judge that during the defence reviews 
from 1966-71, the decisions made to retrench were the correct ones, then the great 
efforts made by Britain during Confrontation, the successes and also the difficulties, 
helped contribute to a sane reassessment of  British global policy. At the same time, 
the positive political outcomes seem enduring: Britain quickly forged a cooperative 
relationship with the post-Sukarno Indonesian government that remains today; 
Malaysian-Indonesian relations remained stable and continue to do so. 
And yet, by extending the temporal envelope, we create a number of 
difficulties. One problem is that the longer the time-frame, the more difficult it 
becomes to determine the relationship between cause and effect: it becomes more and 
more difficult to determine to what extent a given war is responsible for later 
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outcomes.125 Another challenge relates to the problem of metrics: are the same 
metrics appropriate for both short-term and long-term assessments, especially since 
military campaigns can change in nature over time as a result of new political 
objectives, or new facts on the ground. Finally, if we are to focus on the salience of 
long-term outcomes in our definition of victory, then how long is the ‘long-term’?126 
For these reasons, by extending the temporal envelope we complicate greatly 
issues of relating cause and effect: it simply isn't easy to determine the extent to which 
Confrontation itself was an independent, or merely dependent, variable in the re-
shaping of long-term British foreign policy. The decision to cut Britain’s commitment 
in Southeast Asia preceded the end of Confrontation: indeed, Confrontation then acted 
as an obstacle to achieving this goal. More broadly, previous events in Aden seem 
already to have established that British attempts to sustain a large military presence 
globally was a quixotic enterprise that ran against the tide of history. With the 
perspective of hindsight, the impact of Confrontation’s apparent success seems 
limited: success in 1966 did not change the nature of the cuts that Britain intended to 
apply afterwards. The trajectory of Britain’s relationships with the US, Australia, and 
New Zealand were not decisively altered: other conflicts, Vietnam especially, and the 
broader and inexorable decline in Britain’s regional military presence had more 
impact. Australia and New Zealand, for example, continued their shift towards the 
US. Once Confrontation had ended, Anglo-Malaysian relations declined, and whilst 
links remained, not least through the Five Power Defence Pact, which replaced 
AMDA, these links were much weaker: necessarily so, as Britain’s presence in the 
region continued to decline.127 Moreover, the long-term issues surrounding the 
Malaysia project were never fully resolved. There continued to be tensions between 
East and West Malaysia, Malaysia and Indonesia, and between Singapore and 
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Malaysia. Relations between the three countries are workable, but the inclusion of the 
territories of Sarawak and British North Borneo in Malaysia has created a persistent 
irritant.128 
 Second, extending the temporal envelope requires consideration of even more 
potential participants, costs and benefits. For example, in Indonesia, society 
contended with a regime that was 'at best paternalistic and at worst oppressive'.129 The 
New Order regime broke the existing Indonesian political parties; cracked down on 
agencies of free expression, including artists and the media; entrenched the political 
and economic role of the military; and suppressed Islamic radicals.130 Any of these 
could be construed as costs or benefits depending upon whose perspective one takes. 
 Assessing Confrontation is also complicated by where we choose to draw the 
temporal line. For example, the discussion has already identified the Suharto 
government's programme to instrumentalise history. Questions, then, about the 
success or failure of Confrontation could vary from an Indonesian perspective 
depending upon whether one focuses on the period before or after the Asian financial 
crisis and the consequent fall in 2008 of Suharto's New Order regime. The New 
Order's 'Orwellian achievement' of re-writing history continues to be successful even 
today.131 The 1950s continues in Indonesia to be seen as a period characterised as a 
'dynamic road to disaster'.132 The focus on Indonesian popular understanding of the 
period of Confrontation continues to be on the 30 September coup and the intensity of 
the communist threat in that period and after.133 Confrontation has been established as 
a campaign fought creditably by the Indonesian military. Indeed, in 2014, the 
Indonesian navy named one its ships, the KRI Usman Harun, after two 'National 
Heroes of Indonesia' involved in bombings in Singapore in 1965 and executed by 
Singapore in 1968.134 Nevertheless, post-1998 reformasi has begun to create some 
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measure of change. From 2001, formal calls began, even from the Indonesian 
Department of National Education, to 'straighten the history’ (meluruskan sejarah).135 
It may be, then, that at a future point in time some of the traditional cost-benefit 
calculations of the events of 1965-66 might begin in Indonesia to unravel. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Orthodox assessments of Confrontation pitch it as a decisive British victory. 
The argument often advanced is that it was a decisive success militarily: though 
heavily outnumbered, Commonwealth forces succeeded in defeating actual 
Indonesian incursions, and deterring Indonesian escalation. This military success, so it 
is argued, was also decisive politically: if true success in war comprises a result ‘that 
is acknowledged, sustained, and resolves underlying political issues’,136 then it might 
be argued that Confrontation was a success: it met Britain’s declared goals: the 
settlement was formally recognised; and it survived through to the present day.  
Equally, then, Indonesia must have lost - it failed militarily and the final political 
settlement gave it nothing that it had struggled for. Revisionist perspectives have 
questioned these orthodox assumptions. Using archival sources, they have 
demonstrated that for Britain, Confrontation became in many respects self-defeating 
and that Indonesia itself could claim some important successes. 
 As the preceding discussion has shown, clearly the revisionist perspective is 
the more credible. However, assessing Confrontation's outcomes is extraordinarily 
complex and can provide profound insights into the concepts of victory, defeat, and 
the iterative nature of strategy. As the literature on victory identifies, the measure of 
success or failure depends upon what objectives we choose to use as metrics; how we 
 33 
assess costs and benefits; whose perspective we take; what subjective perceptions of 
success or failure may have formed; and over what time-scale we make our 
judgments. By 1966, for the British government what mattered most were domestic 
perceptions and those of its key allies: both of these constituencies viewed 
Confrontation as a victory. In that sense, the peace settlement of August 1966 
reflected a victory for Harold Wilson’s government. In the long run, perceptions of 
British success continued, making it for one author ‘[t]he most successful use of 
armed forces in the twentieth century’.137 But it is possible simultaneously to argue 
that the real losers and winners of Confrontation were Indonesian: the PKI and the 
TNI respectively. The first was, quite literally, destroyed; the second established itself 
until the late 1990s as the unchallenged political power in Indonesia. As 
Confrontation demonstrates, therefore, measuring success and failure in war is often 
hugely problematic: a point that helps to explain why strategy remains relentlessly 
difficult to do well. 
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